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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jeremy Gleese appeals, asserting that the district court erred in executing his 
sentences rather than placing him on probation or retaining jurisdiction in the four 
consolidated cases now on appeal - three probation revocations and one new sentence 
imposed. As part of his appeal, he requested the production of various transcripts, but 
the Idaho Supreme Court denied his motion to augment the appellate record with those 
transcripts. Mr. Gleese contends this constitutes a violation of his state and federal 
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. As a result, this Court should 
grant Mr. Gleese access to the requested transcripts and allow him the opportunity to 
file supplemental briefing raising any issues arising from review of those transcripts. In 
the event that request is denied, this Court should, nevertheless, vacate the district 
court's orders executing his sentences as that decision was an abuse of the district 
court's discretion. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In 2004, Mr. Gleese was charged with burglary when he and some friends stole 
several packages of chips and bottles of Mountain Dew and lemonade (hereinafter, the 
2004 case). (R., pp.32-33.) As part of his plea agreement in that case, Mr. Gleese 
waived his right to appeal the conviction and sentence. (R., p.76.) As this was his first 
adult offense and he appeared amenable to treatment (see Presentence Investigation 
Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.2-3, 5), 1 the district court granted Mr. Gleese's request for 
a withheld judgment and placed him on probation for two years. (R., p.86.) 
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file 
"JEREMY MICHAEL GLEESE 40402-SEALED." Included in this file is the PSI report as 
1 
In 2005, Mr. Gleese was subsequently charged with burglary, aggravated 
assault, malicious injury to property, and two counts of misdemeanor false 
imprisonment (hereinafter, the first 2005 case). (R., pp.109-11.) That case was 
consolidated with the 2004 case, in which a report of probation violation had been filed 
for the new charges, as well as Mr. Gleese's admission to smoking methamphetamine. 
(R., p.116, 119-20.) While that matter was pending, another set of charges for burglary 
and grand theft was filed against Mr. Gleese (hereinafter, the second 2005 case). 
(R., pp.149-50). Mr. Gleese entered a global plea agreement, whereby he would plead 
guilty to two counts of burglary (one from each of the 2005 cases), aggravated assault, 
and malicious injury to property, and the State agreed to dismiss the false 
imprisonment, resisting, under the influence in public, and grand theft charges. 2 
(R., p.177.) 
The district court imposed concurrent sentences in the three cases. (R., pp.198, 
203, 208.) In the 2004 case, the district court revoked the withheld judgment and 
imposed a unified sentence of three and one-half years, with one year fixed. 
(R., p.208.) In the first 2005 case, the district court imposed the following sentences: 
for battery, a unified term of eight years, with two and one-half years fixed; for 
aggravated assault, a unified term of five years, with two years fixed; and for malicious 
injury to property, a unified term of five years, with two years fixed. (R., p.198.) In the 
second 2005 case, the district court imposed a unified term of five years, with two years 
fixed. (R., p.203.) As a result, Mr. Gleese was sentence to an aggregate term of eight 
well as all the documents attached thereto (police reports, addendum from rider staff, 
etc.). 
2 The State agreed to recommend concurrent sentences between all three cases, and 
Mr. Gleese agreed to pay restitution and waive his right to appeal the convictions. 
( R., p. 177.) 
2 
years, with two and one-half years fixed. The district court retained jurisdiction in all the 
cases. (R., pp.199, 203, 208.) 
However, the rider staff determined Mr. Gleese did not meet the criteria for most 
of the programs available on his rider, although it noted he was placed in the 
appropriate program. (PSI, p.43.) Nevertheless, Mr. Gleese actively pursued his GED 
during that period of retained jurisdiction, although his struggles with literacy kept him 
from completing the GED at that time. 3 (PSI, p.46.) However, given adequate time, he 
was expected to be able to earn that certificate. He was not a disciplinary problem. 
(PSI, p.46.) Ultimately, the rider staff, noting Mr. Gleese's significant improvement, 
recommended he be placed on probation. (PSI, pp.44, 47.) Consequently, the district 
court suspended Mr. Gleese's sentences for a five-year period of probation. 
(R., pp.227, 234, 241.) 
Six months later, a report of probation violation was filed in relation to new 
charges arising in Spokane, Washington.4 (R., pp.247-50.) The minutes from the 
subsequent revocation hearing indicate that both the prosecutor and defense attorney 
recommended Mr. Gleese participate in a second rider program. (R., pp.338-39.) The 
district court also indicated that Mr. Gleese had "had no treatment at this time." 
(R., p.339.) As a result, the district court retained jurisdiction again. (R., pp.343, 346, 
349.) 
During that second period of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Gleese was assigned to 
normal programming. (See PSI, p.87; compare PSI, p.43.) The rider staff noted that, 
3 Mr. Gleese has documented learning issues which required participation in special 
education classes, and even caused him to repeat the second grade. (PSI, p.4.) 
4 Mr. Gleese served his related sentence in Washington before being returned to Idaho 
for resolution of the probation revocation proceedings. (See, e.g., R., p.338.) 
3 
while Mr. Gleese displayed some immature behavior, he was not a disciplinary problem. 
(PSI, p.88.) Rather, they concluded that his behavior promised success on probation. 
(PSI, p.88.) For example, when he fell behind in the New Directions program, 
Mr. Gleese was able to bring himself current in the program by seeking assistance from 
the other program participants. (PSI, p.89.) The district court recognized Mr. Gleese's 
good efforts in the rider program and returned him to probation for two years. 
(R., pp.355, 358, 362.) 
In 2011, the State filed new burglary and petit theft charges against Mr. Gleese 
(hereinafter, the 2011 case). (R., p.394.) That case was consolidated with the other 
three cases. (R., p.385.) Mr. Gleese entered a plea agreement, whereby he would 
plead guilty to the burglary charge and the state would not file a habitual offender 
enhancement. (R., p.388.) In addition, the petit theft charge would be dismissed. 
(Tr., p.5, L.27 - p.6, L.1.) The State also agreed to recommend local jail time and 
probation, while Mr. Gleese agreed to waive his right to appeal the conviction. 
(R., p.388.) 
While that new case was pending, the State also filed a report alleging a 
probation violation, which was based on Mr. Gleese's admission that he had used 
methamphetamine. (R., p.423.) That report indicated that Mr. Gleese had been doing 
well on his probation, showed improvement in most regards, and had been moved to 
low supervision. (R., p.408.) For example, his probation officer noted as follows: 
[Mr. Gleese] had been in compliance with his probation since 8/20/10 and 
was at a low level of supervision. He was living with his mother and once 
employed, was working with his brother. He had shown maturity and good 
decision making to that point. He is one of very few offenders I have ever 
seen actually obtain their driver's license, save money and obtain an auto 
loan before searching for a vehicle to purchase. 
4 
(R., p.408.) In fact, his probation officer had been considering moving Mr. Gleese to 
unsupervised probation once he had finished paying his court costs and restitution. 
(R., p.408.) She noted that the relapse was the result of a relationship which developed 
between Mr. Gleese and a female probationer from which he could not extract himself. 
(R., pp.423-24.) As a result, her report recommended Mr. Gleese be sent to another 
rider program so that he could participate in programs to learn to deal with such 
situations. (R., pp.409, 424.) 
As a result of the new report of probation violation, Mr. Gleese's plea agreement 
was amended to include his admission to the probation violations. (See Tr., p.5, Ls.12-
19.) The district court ordered a new PSI report, which recognized that Mr. Gleese has 
a continuing need for treatment, and that he is amenable to such treatment. (PSI, 
p.107.) However, because of his history and inability to fully succeed on probation, 
it recommended that the district court execute his sentences. (PSI, pp.113-14.) The 
district court, focusing on Mr. Gleese's criminal history, indicated that he has "not been 
rehabilitated." (Tr., p.21, Ls.14-15.) As a result, it revoked his probation in the 2004 
and 2005 cases (R., pp.438, 441,444), and imposed a new, concurrent sentence of five 
years, with two years fixed, in the 2011 case. (R., p.436.) It did recommend his 
participation in the therapeutic program while incarcerated. (Tr., p.22, Ls.1-10.) 
Mr. Gleese filed timely notices of appeal from those orders. (R., pp.459-70.) 
On appeal, Mr. Gleese moved the Supreme Court to augment the appellate 
record with the transcripts from the January 22, 2010, admit/deny hearing, the 
March 11, 2010, disposition hearing, and the August 20, 2010, rider review hearing. 
(Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and statement in Support 
5 
Thereof, filed April 29, 2013.) The Idaho Supreme Court denied that motion. (Order 
Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, filed May 22, 2013.) 
6 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Gleese due process and equal 
protection when it denied his motion to augment the record with transcripts 
necessary for review of the issues on appeal. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by executing all of Mr. Gleese's 
sentences without sufficiently considering the mitigating factors in his cases, or 




Whether The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Gleese Due Process And Equal 
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With Transcripts 
Necessary For Review Of The Issues On Appeal 
A. Introduction 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, according to the 
United States Supreme Court, assures indigent defendants that they will not be denied 
access to transcripts which are relevant to issues they intend to raise on appeal. So 
long as the record reflects a colorable need for such a transcript, the courts may not 
refuse to provide that transcript unless the State proves that the transcript is not 
relevant to an issue raised on appeal. 
Mr. Gleese has raised a challenge to the decision to execute his sentences, or, 
alternatively, to not reduce his sentences in the 2004 and 2005 cases sua sponte when 
it did so. To present those claims, he requested that various transcripts be made part of 
the appellate record. The Idaho Supreme Court denied the request for the transcripts 
the January 22, 2010, admit/deny hearing, the March 11, 2010, disposition hearing, and 
the August 20, 2010, rider review hearing. 
As such, Mr. Gleese is also challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his 
request for these transcripts on appeal. Mr. Gleese asserts that the requested 
transcripts are relevant to the challenge of the district court's decisions when it revoked 
his probation and executed his sentence because the applicable standard of review 
requires an appellate court to conduct an independent review of the entirety of the 
proceedings in order to properly evaluate the district court's decisions. 
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B. By Failing To Provide Mr. Gleese With Access To The Requested Transcripts, 
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Gleese Due Process And Equal Protection 
Because He Cannot Obtain An Effective Appellate Review Of His Claims 
The United States Constitution, as well as the Constitution of the State of Idaho 
guarantees criminal defendants due process and equal protection under the law. 
U.S. CONST. amend XIV; IDAHO CONST. art I,§ 13. Due process requires the defendant 
be given notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319, 333 (1976); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 445 (1991), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88 (1998). Essentially, due process requires that 
judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of Durham 
City, 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981); Card, 121 Idaho at 445. Those same standards have 
been applied to article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Maresh v. State, Dep't of 
Health & Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998). 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to an appeal is created by statute. See 
I.C. § 19-2801. If an indigent defendant requests a relevant transcript, such transcript 
must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-863(a); I.C.R. 5.2(a); 
I.C.R. 54.7(a). A judgment of conviction imposing a new sentence is appealable as a 
matter of right. I.AR. 11(c)(1). Similarly, an order revoking probation is made after the 
judgment of conviction and affects the defendant's substantial rights. State v. Dryden, 
105 Idaho 848, 852 (Ct. App. 1983). As such, it may be appealed as a matter of right. 
I.AR. 11 (c)(9); State v. Thomas, 146 Idaho 592, 594 (2008). 
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the question of whether 
transcripts must be provided when such a right is established. Its decisions have 
established two fundamental themes. First, the scope of the due process and equal 
protection clauses is broad. Second, disparate treatment of indigent defendants is not 
9 
tolerable. As a result, the State must provide an adequate record for appellate review, 
but that record need not include frivolous or unnecessary materials. 
The seminal opinion from the United States Supreme Court is Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U.S. 12 (1956). In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial 
court asking that a certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript 
of the proceedings, be furnished [to] them without cost." Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13. At that 
time, the State of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been 
sentenced to death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase 
transcripts themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme 
Court was whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death-penalty 
defendants was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16. 
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, 
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem .... Both equal protection and due 
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with 
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of 
justice in every American court."' Id. at 16-17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 
U.S. 227, 241 (1940)). As such, "[i]n criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on 
account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. Furthermore: 
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the 
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a 
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that 
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their 
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois 
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal 
10 
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitions from invidious 
discriminations. 
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional 
mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be 
provided with a record which facilitates an effective, merits-related appellate review. 
At the same time, the United States Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript 
is not necessary in instances where a less expensive, but no less adequate, alternative 
exists. Id. at 20. 
The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Griffin when it struck 
down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court be accompanied with a 
requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency. See Bums v. Ohio, 360 
U.S. 252 (1959). The Court held: 
[O]nce the State chooses to establish appellate review in criminal cases, it 
may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that procedure 
because of their poverty. This principle is no less applicable where the 
State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase of its 
appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second 
phase of that procedure solely because of his indigency. 
Id. at 257. To permit otherwise, according to the Court, would result in an impermissible 
destruction of the defendant's ability to pursue the right afforded him by the State. Id. at 
258. 
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court addressed how courts should 
go about determining whether defendants are entitled to certain transcripts. See 
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963). The Court clarified its statement in Griffin 
- that a stenographic transcript is not necessary if an equivalent alternative is available. 
Id. at 495. "[P]art or all of the stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be 
germane to consideration of the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its 
11 
funds unnecessarily in such circumstances." Id. The Court went on to discuss the 
specific issues raised for appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the 
requested transcripts, and it ultimately concluded that the issues raised by those 
defendant could not be adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic 
transcripts of the trial proceedings. Id. at 497-99. 
The United States Supreme Court continued to expand the protections identified 
in Griffin, applying them to non-felony offenses. See Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 
U.S. 189 (1971). Additionally, it placed the burden on the State to prove that the 
requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on appeal. Id. at 
195. In doing so, the Court held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument 
that he or she needs the requested items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. 
If a review of the appellate record establishes a need for the requested transcripts, it 
becomes the State's burden to prove that the requested transcripts are not necessary 
for the appeal. Id. 
Both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have recognized 
and applied the United States Supreme Court's precedent in this regard. See, e.g., 
Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 
2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 2007). As such, if the record reflects 
that the transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal and the State has not proved 
that they are unnecessary for appellate review thereof, due process and equal 
protection mandate that those transcripts be created and augmented to the record. 
12 
C. The Transcripts Requested By Mr. Gleese Are Relevant To The Issues He Has 
Raised On Appeal Because The Appellate Courts Independently Review The 
Entire Record Before The District Court When Reviewing Decisions To Revoke 
Probation And Execute The Underlying Sentence Without Reduction 
The requested transcripts are necessary to review Mr. Gleese's claim that the 
district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation, or, alternatively, failed 
to reduce his sentence sua sponte when it did so. "When we review a sentence that is 
ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record 
encompassing events before and after the original judgment. We base our review upon 
the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between 
the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 
26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added). In other words, an appellate court reviewing 
a district court's determinations regarding a defendant's sentence conducts an 
independent review of the entire record to determine if the record supports those 
decisions. Id. This standard of review is necessary in Idaho because judges are not 
required to state their sentencing rationale on the record. See State v. Nield, 106 Idaho 
665, 666 (1984). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan, 153 
Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012), which addressed the scope of review of an order revoking a 
defendant's probation. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on 
probation. Id. at 619. After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to violating 
the terms of his probation and the district court revoked his probation, although it 
retained jurisdiction. Id. at 619-20. After the defendant completed his rider, the district 
court placed the defendant back on probation. Id. at 620. The defendant subsequently 
admitted to violating the terms of his probation and the district court revoked that 
probation. Id. The defendant appealed from the second order revoking probation. Id. 
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On appeal, the defendant in Morgan filed a motion to augment the appellate 
record with transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which 
was denied by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then challenged those 
decisions on appeal, asserting they deprived him of due process and equal protection. 
Id. at 620-21. The Idaho Court of Appeals held that the transcripts of the prior probation 
proceedings were not necessary of the appeal because "they were not before the 
district court in the second probation violation proceedings, and the district court gave 
no indication that it based its revocation decision upon anything that occurred during 
those proceedings."5 Id. at 621. The Court of Appeals then clarified the scope of 
review for a revocation determination: 
5 In Morgan, the Court of Appeals refused to address the defendant's claim that the 
Idaho Supreme Court had denied him due process on the basis that it does not have 
the power to overrule a decision by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. at 621. However, the 
Morgan Court went on to state that it would have the authority to review a renewed 
motion to augment, which contained information or argument not presented to the Idaho 
Supreme Court, if it was filed with the Court of Appeals after the case was assigned 
to it. Id.; see also State v. Cornelison, _ P.3d _, 2013 Opinion No.22, pp.3-4 
(Ct. App. April 11, 2013) (not yet final); State v. Thompson, 2013 Unpublished Opinion 
No.439, p.3 (Ct. App. April 9, 2013) (not yet final). This position is untenable because 
the Idaho Appellate Rules require all motions to be filed directly with the Idaho Supreme 
Court and expressly prohibit separate filings in the Court of Appeals: 
All motions, petitions, briefs and other appellate documents, other than the 
initial notice of appeal, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court 
as required by the Idaho Appellate Rules with the court heading of the 
Supreme Court of the State of Idaho as provided by Rule 6. There shall 
be no separate filings directed to or filed with the Court of Appeals. In the 
event of an assignment to the Court of Appeals, the title of the proceeding 
and the identifying number thereof shall not be changed except that the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court may add additional letters or other notations 
to the case number so as to identify the assignment of the case. All case 
filed shall be maintained in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court. 
I.AR. 110 (emphasis added). Furthermore, I.AR. 30 requires all motions to augment 
be filed with the Supreme Court: 
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[l]n reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily 
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the 
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that a// 
proceedings in the trial court up to an including sentencing are germane. 
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision 
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the 
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues 
which are properly made part of the record on appeal. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
However, whether or not the transcripts of the requested proceedings were 
before the district court at the time of the probation revocation hearing is irrelevant in 
regard to whether the transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal. In reaching a 
decision regarding the defendant's sentence, a district court is not limited to considering 
only that information offered at the hearing from which the appeal is filed. Rather, a 
court is entitled to utilize knowledge gained from its own official position and 
observations. See Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also 
Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the 
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record. 
Unless otherwise expressly ordered by the Supreme Court such motion 
shall be determined without oral argument. The reporter's transcript and 
clerk's or agency's record may also be augmented or portions deleted by 
stipulation of the parties and order of the Supreme Court. 
I.AR. 30 (emphasis added). Mr. Gleese is not aware of any court rule which allows a 
party to file a motion directly with the Court of Appeals. Since I.AR. 110 expressly 
prohibits such filings, the Morgan Court's statement that the defendant could have filed 
a renewed motion to augment directly with the Court of Appeals is contrary to the Idaho 
Appellate Rules. Mr. Gleese recognizes that the facts in Morgan are similar to those in 
his case, but, as articulated infra, he disagrees with that decision, which should be 
overruled because it is directly contrary to the appellate rules. 
Mr. Gleese is also aware that the Court of Appeals has recently rejected the 
argument in regard to the applicability of the appellate rules. Cornelison, 2013 Opinion 
No.22, pp.3-6. However, Cornelison is not yet final and Mr. Gleese also disagrees with 
the holding in that case. 
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State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that the findings of the trial judge 
in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the district court heard during trial); State v. 
Wallace, 98 Idaho 318, 321 (1977) (recognizing that the district court could rely upon 
"the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed in the 
courts within his judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein involved"). In fact, the 
Court of Appeals has held that such review is not only proper, but is actually expected 
because "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he already knew about 
[the defendant] from the other case." State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491, 495 (Ct. App. 
1984). Thus, whether the prior hearings were transcribed at the time of the revocation 
hearing leading to the appeal is irrelevant because the district court may rely upon the 
information it already knows from presiding over the prior hearings when it made the 
sentencing decision after revoking probation. 
The reason that the appellate courts should look to the entire record when 
reviewing the executed sentence has been explained by the Court of Appeals: 
[W]hen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has 
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before 
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two 
reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order 
execution of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not 
artificially segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment 
categories. The judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire 
course of events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. 
When reviewing that decision, we should consider the same facts. 
Second, when a sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the 
defendant has scant reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the 
probation is later revoked, and the sentence ordered into execution, does 
the issue of an excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were 
we to adopt the state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived 
if not made on immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but 
suspending a sentence, defendants· would be forced to file preventive 
appeals as a hedge against the risk that probation someday might be 
revoked. We see no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do 
we wish to see the appellate system cluttered with such cases. 
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State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct. App. 1989). As such, when an appellant 
files an appeal from a sentence executed after the revocation of probation, the 
applicable standard of review requires an independent and comprehensive inquiry into 
the events which occurred prior to the probation revocation proceedings, as well as the 
events which occurred during those proceedings. 
The basis for this standard of review is that the district court "naturally and quite 
properly remembers the entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in 
reaching a decision." Id. It follows that "[w]hen reviewing that decision, [an appellate 
court] should consider the same facts." Id. The Court of Appeals did not state that the 
district court must expressly reference prior proceedings at the probation disposition 
hearing in order for this standard to become applicable. To the contrary, the Court of 
Appeals assumed the district court will automatically consider the prejudgment events 
when determining what sentence should be executed after revoking probation. 
Therefore, whether or not the prior hearings were transcribed is irrelevant, as an 
appellate court will assume that the district court will remember the events from the prior 
proceedings when it executes a sentence after revoking probation. 
It is true, in this case, that two different district court judges presided over 
hearings. The Honorable Charles W. Hosack presided over the initial hearings. When 
he retired, Mr. Gleese's cases were reassigned to the Honorable Benjamin R. Simpson. 
(See R., p.315.) As a result, Mr. Gleese should at least have been afforded the 
transcripts from the hearings over which Judge Simpson presided, since it is from one 
of Judge Simpson's decisions that Mr. Gleese has appealed. See Downing, 136 Idaho 
at 373-74; Adams, 115 Idaho at 1055-56; see also Sivak, 105 Idaho at 907; Wallace, 98 
Idaho at 321; Gibson, 106 Idaho at 495. 
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Since the requested transcripts are within the applicable standard of review, the 
Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny Mr. Gleese access to those transcripts 
constitutes a violation of his due process and equal protection rights. See, e.g., Mayer, 
404 U.S. at 195; Callaghan, 143 Idaho at 859. For example, when a verbatim transcript 
was necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the appellate court, the courts improperly 
foreclosed access to the appellate process by denying indigent defendants access to 
such transcripts. Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 480-85 (1963). The United States 
Supreme Court made it clear that it is "constitutionally invalid ... to prevent an indigent 
from taking an effective appeal." Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, in Idaho, an appellant 
must provide an adequate record for review or face procedural default: "It is well 
established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon 
which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where 
pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the 
actions of the trial court."6 State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing 
State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416, 422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541 
6 If transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes of those hearings, it is 
possible the appellate courts might find that to be sufficient to conduct a meaningful 
appellate review, and so the transcripts are not necessary for appellate review in such a 
case. However, the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate 
counsel not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] 
Court's review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). Given that 
holding, it is unlikely that the minutes will be sufficient to conduct a meaningful review, 
and thus, a record containing only the minutes is unlikely to comport with the 
constitutional requirements to provide due process and equal protection. 
In this case, the minutes only contain summaries of the statements made, not the 
full contents of their statements. The contents of those statements, particularly the 
defendant's statements of allocution, are relevant to the excessive sentence claim. 
See, e.g., State v. Gervasi, 138 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App. 2003). The missing 
transcripts in this case would contain such statements. (See R., pp.323-26, 336-39, 
351-53.) Therefore, the minutes, which do not provide the substance of these 
statements, are insufficient in this case to provide for adequate review. 
18 
(Ct. App. 1992); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991 ); State v. Murinko, 
108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985)). Therefore, if Mr. Gleese fails to provide the 
appellate court with the transcripts necessary for review of his claim, this legal 
presumption will apply and Mr. Gleese's claims regarding the excessiveness of his 
sentence will not be addressed on their merits. In effect, that presumption (a result of 
the Idaho Supreme Court not affording him access to relevant transcripts) would deprive 
him of an effective appeal, making the appeal constitutionally invalid on due process 
and equal protection grounds. See Lane, 372 U.S. at 480-85. 
Alternatively, if it is state action alone which prevents the defendant from access 
to the necessary items, because such action is a violation of equal protection and due 
process, any such presumption should no longer apply. See, e.g., id. at 485. In that 
situation, the foregoing presumption should be reversed in this case and what occurred 
at those hearings should be presumed to discredit the district court's ultimate decision 
to revoke probation. When Mr. Gleese was first placed on probation and given the 
opportunity for multiple periods of probation thereafter, the district court must have 
found, at each subsequent hearing, that the circumstances were right to give 
Mr. Gleese the opportunity to continue his rehabilitation as a member of society. See 
State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998). Therefore, by placing Mr. Gleese on 
probation on each of those prior occasions, the district court must have determined that 
the mitigating factors presented outweighed the aggravating factors presented. See 
I.C. § 19-2521; Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648. As such, to presume that the missing 
transcripts of those hearings supports the decision to revoke probation ignores the 
mitigating factors that were present at those hearings and presents a negative, one-
sided view of Mr. Gleese. As a result, the denial of access to the requested transcripts 
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has prevented Mr. Gleese from addressing those positive factors in support of his 
appellate claims. In light of that denial, Mr. Gleese argues that the events which 
occurred at the subject hearings should, at least, be presumed to invalidate the district 
court's final sentencing decisions in this matter. 
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both 
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts necessary for 
an effective, merits-based review on appeal. The requested transcripts are relevant to 
the issues on appeal because the applicable standard of review for an appellate 
sentencing claim requires the appellate court to conduct an independent review of all 
the proceedings before the district court. Under this standard of review, the focus is not 
on the district court's express sentencing rationale; to the contrary, the question on 
appeal is if the record itself supports the district court's ultimate sentencing decision. As 
such, the decision to deny Mr. Gleese's request for the necessary transcripts will render 
his appeal ineffective and meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing 
transcripts support the district court's sentencing decisions. This functions as a 
procedural bar to the appellate review of Mr. Gleese's sentencing claims on the merits 
and, therefore, he should either be provided with the requested transcripts or the 
presumption should not be applied. Since Mr. Gleese's request for those transcripts 
was denied, that presumption means that the district court's sentencing decisions 
should be reversed. 
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D. By Failing To Provide Mr. Gleese With Access To The Requested Transcripts, 
The Idaho Supreme Court Has Denied Him Due Process Because He Cannot 
Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal 
The United States Supreme Court, relying on Griffin, supra, and its progeny, 
determined that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also gives 
defendants the right to counsel on appeal and requires effective representation: 
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to 
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant 
has a right to counsel at trial-would be a futile gesture unless it 
comprehended the right to the effective assistance of counsel. 
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397 (1985) (relying on Douglas v. California, 372 
U.S. 353, 355-56 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963)). As 
such, the remaining issue is defining what constitutes effective assistance of counsel on 
appeal. 
According to the United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a 
conscientious examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments 
to be made. See, e.g., Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). The 
constitutional requirements of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained 
where counsel acts as an active advocate on behalf of his client. ... [Counsel's] role 
as advocate requires that he support his client's appeal to the best of his ability. Id.; 
see also Banuelos v. State, 127 Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack 
of access to the requested transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a 
conscientious examination of the case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel 
from determining whether there is an additional issue to raise or whether there is factual 
support in favor of, or cutting against, any argument made. Therefore, Mr. Gleese has 
not obtained appellate review of the court proceedings based on the merits of his claims 
and likely was not provided with effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor. 
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Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the starting point for 
evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance in a criminal action is the 
American Bar Association's Standards For Criminal Justice, The Defense Function. 
State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989), overruled on other grounds by Card, 
121 Idaho 425. These standards offer insight into the role and responsibilities of 
appellate counsel. Specifically, those standards state: 
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel 
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance. 
Standard 4-8.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate 
counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be 
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's 
decision to revoke probation, which is now at issue. Further, counsel is unable to 
advise Mr. Gleese on the probable role the transcripts may play in his appeal. 
Mr. Gleese is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and 
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant 
transcripts. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Gleese his 
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection which include the right to 
effective assistance of counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be 
provided with access to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Executing All Of Mr. Gleese's Sentences 
Without Sufficiently Considering The Mitigating Factors In His Cases, Or Alternatively, 
By Failing To Reduce The Sentences When It Revoked Probation 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Gleese contends that the district court abused its discretion when it decided 
to execute the sentences in his case, rather than place him on probation or retain 
jurisdiction. The district court focused on his criminal history, but did not sufficiently 
consider the mitigating factors in this case, most notably, the report that Mr. Gleese had 
been doing well during his most recent period of probation, improving himself in most 
respects. The district court also needed to sufficiently consider the information in that 
report which noted that all Mr. Gleese needed was targeted programming to address a 
specific type of situation that he had not been prepared to deal with. The evidence of 
continued growth and improvement from Mr. Gleese's first period of retained jurisdiction 
onward shows that incarceration was inappropriate in this case at this time under the 
recognized sentencing objectives. As such, the district court's decision to execute all 
the sentences, or at least, to not reduce the sentences from the 2004 and 2005 cases 
when it did so, constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
B. The District Court Needed To Sufficiently Consider The Mitigating Factors In This 
Case 
In regard to the 2011 case, Mr. Gleese contends that his sentence is excessive, 
in that the district court executed that sentence rather than place Mr. Gleese on 
probation or retain jurisdiction. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court 
imposed an excessively harsh sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent 
review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of 
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the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 
771, 772 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Gleese does not allege that 
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, he must show that, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence is 
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria, or sentencing 
objectives, are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public 
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for 
wrongdoing. Id. The protection of society is the primary objective the court should 
consider. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). Therefore, a sentence that 
protects society and also accomplishes the other objectives will be considered 
reasonable. Id.; State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). This is because 
the protection of society is influenced by each of the other objectives, and as a result, 
each must be addressed in sentencing. Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500; I.C. § 19-2521. 
There are several factors that the appellate court should consider to determine 
whether the objectives are served by a particular sentence. State v. Knighton, 143 
Idaho 318, 320 (2006). They include, but are not limited to: "the defendant's good 
character, status as a first-time offentler, sincere expressions of remorse and 
amenability to treatment, and support of family." Id. Insufficient consideration of these 
factors has been the basis for a more lenient sentence in several cases. See, e.g., 
Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 
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209 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on 
other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301 (1990); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 
(1982). In this case, several of those factors are present, but were insufficiently 
considered by the district court as it crafted Mr. Gleese's sentence, and, as a result, the 
sentence does not serve the objectives, and is excessive. 
Additionally, Mr. Gleese asserts that, given any view of the facts, the decision to 
revoke probation and execute his sentences in the 2004 and 2005 cases was an abuse 
of the district court's discretion. As with the imposition of sentence, the decision to 
revoke probation is one within the district court's discretion. State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 
308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000). The district court must determine "whether the probation is 
achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continuation of the probation is 
consistent with the protection of society." Id. The Legislature has established the 
criteria for determining whether probation or incarceration is merited. State v. Merwin, 
131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998) (citing I.C. § 19-2521). In reviewing such a decision, the 
Court of Appeals uses a multi-tiered inquiry, determining "(1) whether the lower court 
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted 
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistent with any legal standards 
applicable to the specific choice before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason." Id. at 312-13 (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 
598, 600 (1989). 
In this case, several of those factors are present, but were insufficiently 
considered by the district court as it crafted its disposition in regard to Mr. Gleese. As a 
result, it did not sufficiently consider whether Mr. Gleese's probation was adequately 
serving the goal of rehabilitation or whether society required protection from Mr. Gleese 
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through incarceration. See Chavez, 134 Idaho at 312. Therefore, this disposition 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
One of the issues that has underlain these cases is Mr. Gleese's educational 
needs. Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires that a trial court consider the mental condition of 
a defendant at sentencing. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). From the 
beginning, it has been clear that Mr. Gleese has struggled in his programming because 
of difficulties reading and speaking the English language. (PSI, p.4.) He has always 
struggled in this regard, participating in special education classes and repeating the 
second grade. (PSI, p.4.) In fact, the impact of this condition resulted in his first period 
of retained jurisdiction being less than expected in terms of programming received. 
(PSI, p.43; R., p.339.) That factor needed to be taken into consideration by the district 
court when it considered whether probation or a rider would adequately serve the 
sentencing objectives. See Hollon, 132 Idaho at 581. 
In fact, the record indicates substantial growth by Mr. Gleese in this regard 
throughout these cases, which means the periods of probation and retained jurisdiction 
were doing exactly what they were supposed to do: rehabilitating Mr. Gleese. 
Therefore, the decision to give up on those programs in the face of their success 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500 (promoting 
rehabilitation is one of the objectives to be considered in sentencing determinations). 
During his first period of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Gleese dedicated substantial time to 
working toward his GED, and the staff noted that, even accounting for his struggles with 
literacy, he was still expected to be able to complete that program. (PSI, p.46.) In fact, 
his improvement was so substantial that the next time he was sent to the rider facility, 
he was assigned to complete the normal course of programs. (See PSI, p.87; compare, 
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PSI, pp.43, 45-46.) And, while he struggled at times with those programs, he was able 
to take the initiative, seek assistance from his classmates, and get himself caught back 
up. (PSI, p.89.) The program instructor noted "I have seen a significant change in 
Mr. Gleese's attitude and self-confidence level." (PSI, p.89.) Based on such 
developments during the program, Mr. Gleese earned a second recommendation for 
probation. (See, e.g., PSI, p.89.) 
His growth did not end there. For over a year, Mr. Gleese was able to comply 
with probation. (See R., pp.407-08 (indicating that Mr. Gleese was in compliance with 
the terms of his probation from August 20, 2010, through, approximately, December 26, 
2011).) In fact, he had earned the right to be subject to a low level of supervision 
and "he was being considered for unsupervised probation as soon as he paid his 
court ordered financial obligations." (R., p.408.) His probation officer was very 
complimentary of his performance during that time: "He was living with his mother and 
once employed, was working with his brother.7 He had shown maturity and good 
decision making to that point. He is one of very few offenders I have ever seen actually 
obtain their driver's license, save money and obtain an auto loan before searching for a 
vehicle to purchase." (R., p.408.) As a result of his improvement, even considering his 
past history, Mr. Gleese's probation officer recommended the district court continue to 
7 Family constitutes an important part of a support network, which can help in 
rehabilitation. See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 817 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that 
familial support offered to affirm the defendant's innocence does not equate to familial 
support offered in consideration of rehabilitation, implying that had the support been 
offered for rehabilitation, it would be a mitigating factor worthy of consideration). As his 
father indicated to the district court, Mr. Gleese does have a significant support network. 
(See R., p.338.) Therefore, this factor indicates Mr. Gleese is more likely to continue to 
succeed on probation. 
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try to rehabilitate Mr. Gleese rather than simply send him to prison. His probation officer 
clarified that recommendation in an addendum to her report, noting: 
[Mr. Gleese] became involved with a female probationer and has not been 
able to separate himself from her. I believe his relationship with her is at 
the root of his initial relapse and new crimes .... [he] would also benefit 
from cognitive restructuring to help him deal with relationship issues and 
boundary setting. As previously noted, Mr. Gleese had been doing well on 
his probation and now it appears his downfall can be, in part, attributed to 
the relationship he developed with the female probationer. 
(R., pp.423-24.) This evidence speaks highly of Mr. Gleese's continued ability to 
rehabilitate and to become a productive member of society. 
By not sufficiently considering this growth in its sentencing determination, but 
instead focusing only on Mr. Gleese's criminal history, the district court failed to 
recognize or consider one of the four objectives in sentencing: rehabilitation. To that 
end, the Idaho Supreme Court has realized that timing is an important consideration 
when addressing rehabilitation. See State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971); State v. 
Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). The Court of Appeals has also continued to recognize 
that timely and effective rehabilitation justifies lesser prison sentences. Cook, 145 
Idaho at 489; State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1988). Timing is an 
important consideration in this case, as Mr. Gleese was only twenty-six years old at the 
most recent sentencing.8 (See PSI, p.97.) As such, the time to invest in rehabilitative 
8 Studies indicate that a young person's character continues to develop into early 
adulthood. See, e.g., Brief for the American Psychological Association, et al. as Amici 
Curiae in Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010), 2009 WL 2236778, at 12. For 
example, a young person's ability to consider future consequences of an action 
continues to develop into the early 20s. Id. (referencing Jari-Erik Nurmi, How Do 
Adolescents See Their Future? A Review of the Development of Future Orientation and 
Planning, 11 Developmental Rev. 1, 28-29 (1991 ); Laurence Steinberg et al., Age 
Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting, 80 Child Dev. 28, 30, 35-36 
(2009).) As such, when a defendant is of an age similar to Mr. Gleese's, his age is a 
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programming is now, as Mr. Gleese is not only more likely to be receptive to such 
programming, but has actually demonstrated continued amenability to such treatment 
and shows good potential to continue improving in the future. And since sentences are 
to be crafted so that they do not force the prison system to continue detaining a person 
once rehabilitation or age has decreased the risk of recidivism, Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; 
Eubank, 114 Idaho at 639, incarcerating Mr. Gleese when age and rehabilitation are 
reducing that risk means that this sentence constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
A sufficient examination of all these factors reveals that a suspended sentence, 
taking Mr. Gleese's rehabilitative efforts and potential into sufficient consideration, still 
addresses all the other objectives - protection of society, punishment, and deterrence. 
See State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 713 (1993) (requiring that alternative sentences 
still address all the sentencing objectives). When a sentencing court suspends a 
sentence and orders probation, it still imposes a sentence. Therefore, both the 
retributive and the deterrent effects of the imposed sentence are still present. See 
State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15 (Ct. App. 2008) (discussing how a sentence for a 
period of probation addresses all the sentencing objectives and how the court's 
continuing jurisdiction affects those objectives). 
In addition to restricting Mr. Gleese's liberty at the discretion of the Board of 
Correction and the looming sentence, a suspended sentence would also deprive him of 
several of his rights (such as the right to possess a firearm), since this is a felony 
offense. Furthermore, the district court would retain the ability to revoke probation and 
factor which weighs in mitigation because it speaks significantly to this rehabilitative 
potential. Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; Eubank, 114 Idaho at 639; Shideler, 103 Idaho at 
395. A younger offender should be treated more leniently because he is still maturing, 
and still able to become a productive member of society. See, e.g., State v. Dunnagan, 
101 Idaho 125, 126 (1980). 
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execute the original sentence if Mr. Gleese were to fail to adhere to the terms of his 
probation. However, it could do so knowing that all the sentencing objectives properly 
addressed. What the probationary period would provide that a term sentence would not 
is the opportunity to rehabilitate in a real-world setting, allowing Mr. Gleese to apply the 
lessons he would gain in out-patient treatment in a practical setting. 
Alternatively, the district court would not lose anything in terms of protection of 
society, deterrence, or punishment by retaining jurisdiction. Society would have 
received equally similar protection by retaining jurisdiction as it would by incarcerating 
him. Mr. Gleese would be in the custody of the Department of Correction either way. 
He could not harm society during that period, so society would be protected whether he 
was on a rider or in prison. Furthermore, the district court would retain the ability to 
relinquish jurisdiction and leave Mr. Gleese incarcerated for the entire fixed term of the 
sentence if he does not show progress. And if the district court did that, the parole 
board would have broad discretion over whether to release him on parole during the 
indeterminate term of his sentence. See, e.g., State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 931 
(2005). However, the district court could relinquish jurisdiction and enforce the prison 
sentence knowing that all the sentencing objectives were properly addressed. What the 
rider would provide that a term sentence does not is the opportunity to rehabilitate, and 
as the Supreme Court has noted, rehabilitation is more likely now than in the future. 
See Owen, 73 Idaho at 402. 
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C. Alternatively, The District Court Should Have Reduced The Sentences In The 
2004 And 2005 Cases When It Revoked Mr. Gleese's Probation In Those Cases 
Even if the district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Mr. Gleese's 
probation in the 2004 and 2005 cases, it did abuse its discretion by not further reducing 
Mr. Gleese's sentences pursuant to Rule 35 when it did so. If the district court decides 
to resume the execution of the underlying sentence by revoking probation, it also has 
the authority to reduce the sentence, sua sponte, pursuant to Rule 35. State v. 
Timbana, 145 Idaho 779, 782 (2008). 
The decision to not reduce a previously-pronounced sentence will be reversed on 
appeal if it constitutes an abuse of the district court's discretion. State v. Hanington, 
148 Idaho 26, 27 (Ct. App. 2009). The standard of review and factors considered in 
such a decision are the same as those used for the initial sentencing. Id.; see Toohi/1, 
103 Idaho at 568 (identifying the factors to be considered at sentencing). Therefore, the 
district court needed to sufficiently consider the recognized sentencing objectives in light 
of the mitigating factors in the record. See id.; Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. A failure 
to do so should result in a more lenient sentence. See, e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at 
489-90; Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595. 
Therefore, for all the reasons articulated in Section ll(B), supra, as well as in 
recognition of Mr. Gleese's otherwise successful participation on probation. Even if this 
Court decides the decision to execute Mr. Gleese's sentences was not erroneous, it 
should, at least, reduce them as it deems appropriate in recognition of Mr. Gleese's 
growth throughout this process. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and 
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which 
arise as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Gleese 
respectfully requests this Court vacate the orders executing his sentences. 
Alternatively, he requests this Court reduce his sentences as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 29th day of May, 2013. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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